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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMM'N OF MD. v. KINNANE:
DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY BASED ON RULES 1.5(E)
AND 8.4(B) & (C) OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HELD PROPER WHERE
VIOLATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED AND NO
MITIGATING OR COMPELLING EXTENUATING
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST
By: Kellie Gombeski
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that attorney disbannent is
a proper sanction once intentionally dishonest conduct is established
and there is an absence of mitigating or compelling extenuating
circumstances. Attorney Grievance Comm 'n of Md. v. Kinnane, 390
Md. 324, 888 A.2d 1178 (2005). In so holding, the Court adopted the
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland's recommendation and
disbarred Thomas Kinnane ("Kinnane") on the grounds that Kinnane
violated Rules 1.5(e) and 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id. at 340,888 A.2d at 1188.
While Kinnane was employed by Alexander & Cleaver he met
Andrew Chau ("Chau"), the manager of regulatory affairs for Shell
Energy Services ("Shell"), who represented himself to be an attorney.
Kinnane continued to represent Shell after he left Alexander &
Cleaver and also perfonned work for Chau's subsequent employer,
Tractebel Power ("Tractebel"), after Chau left Shell Energy. During
Kinnane's representation of Shell, his customary practice was to
invoice Shell for work after it had been completed, rather than collect
a retainer for future work.
However, around July 2001, Chau
contacted Kinnane and stated that he was authorized by the vice
president of Shell to pay Kinnane a $70,000 retainer for future work.
On July 26, 200 1, Kinnane prepared an invoice from his finn, Howes
& Kinnane, P.C., to Shell for ''Nevada regulatory and government
relations activities, 2001 session and implementation." On August 8,
2001, Shell paid $70,000 to Kinnane by electronic transfer and
Kinnane held the money in the finn's escrow account. Kinnane had
never received a retainer from Shell before this payment.
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On or about August 22, 2001, Chau called Kinnane and directed
him to take the entire retainer as a bonus for all the work he had
completed in the past at a discounted rate, and further instructed
Kinnane to issue a $35,000 check to Chau to compensate him for
referring future business from Shell and its affiliates, including
Tractebel. That same day, Kinnane transferred $70,000 into the firm's
operating account, issued a $35,000 check to Andrew Chau &
Associates, P.C., indicating that it was for "professional fees:
consulting," and drew himself a check for $35,000 from the firm's
operating account. After receiving Kinnane's invoice, the vice
president and another member of Shell contacted Kinnane and
informed him that the $70,000 payment had not been authorized by
Shell. Chau then called Kinnane and told him that the invoice "might
not have been approved." Kinnane believed the issue was an internal
dispute to be handled between Chau and the supervisors at Shell.
Subsequently, on April 30, 2003, Chau and Kinnane were charged
with felony theft in Texas. On June 11, 2003, in the Harris County
District Court, Kinnane entered a deferred adjudication of guilt. He
also paid restitution in the amount of $35,000, a fine of $2,000,
provided information in the prosecution of Chau, and cooperated fully
with the Bar Counsel's investigation.
The hearing court found by clear and convincing evidence that
Kinnane violated Rules 1.5(e) and 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing court noted Kinnane
violated rule 1.5(e) by splitting his fee from Shell with Chau because
Chau performed no services to earn that portion of the fee and Shell
never authorized Kinnane to share the fee with Chau. The hearing
court further held that. the division of fees was not in proportion to the
work performed since Chau was being compensated for making future
referrals. The hearing court found that Kinnane's conviction for
felony theft reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and
fitness as a lawyer and his misrepresentations were in violation of
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the hearing court's
ruling and held there were sufficient facts present to support the
hearing court's conclusion of law. Id. at 335, 888 A.2d at 1185. The
Court held that Kinnane could not reasonably have believed that Chau
had authorization from Shell to pay a bonus to Kinnane to be shared
with Chau. Id. at 332, 888 A.2d at 1183. Further, Kinnane's
invoicing of the $70,000 fee, which was unearned, and his invoice
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evidencing the $35,000 paid to Chau as a professional fee for
consulting services were dishonest misrepresentations. ld.
After the hearing court's ruling, Kinnane filed Exceptions to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on two theories. ld.
First, Kinnane argued there was no evidence supporting the contention
that it was unreasonable for him to believe that Chau had authorization
from Shell to pay him a bonus. ld. at 333, 888 A.2d at 1183-84. To
the contrary, Kinnane argued his actions demonstrated he had a good
faith belief that the bonus was properly paid. ld. He supported this
contention by claiming he had no knowledge that Chau would later
request he split the bonus in half. ld. The Court overruled Kinnane's
exception and pointed to the facts upon which the hearing court relied.
ld. at 334-35, 888 A.2d at 1184-85. These facts, which Kinnane took
no exception to, included the course of dealings between the client and
Kinnane, the failure on Kinnane' s part to notify the client that the
payment was not for services already performed, and the large amount
of the requested payment. Id.
Kinnane's second exception was the hearing court's refusal to
admit the Peer Review Panel's Report. ld. at 335, 888 A.2d at 1185.
The Court of Appeals looked to Maryland Rule 16-473, which governs
the peer review process and noted the limited role the panel performs.
ld. The Court held that despite the common sense appeal of
permitting the use of statements made during the peer review process
to expose later inconsistencies or intentional misrepresentations, the
better course was to adapt to the phrase "what happens in Peer Review
stays in Peer Review." ld. at 338, 888 A.2d at 1186-87 (citing
Attorney Grievance Cornrn 'n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108, 874 A.2d 897,
908 (2005)). The Court explained that the peer review process is an
informal and nonadversarial meeting designed to allow Bar Counsel,
the respondent attorney, and the complainant to meet and discuss
issues presented in the complaint. Kinnane, 390 Md. at 336,888 A.2d
at 1186. The Court further noted that although the panel review
process is not governed by any formal rules of evidence, it must
respect lawful privileges and its principal purpose is not to make
recommendations as to the appropriateness of formal charges. ld. The
Court held that compelling reasons in this case warranted an insulation
of peer review panel reports from subsequent disclosure at later stages
of the attorney discipline, especially considering the reports are nonbinding, non-dispositive and purely recommendatory in nature. ld. at
338,888 A.2d at 1187.
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Although Kinnane did not specifically recommend a sanction for
his conduct, he did contest and urge a penalty short of disbarment. Id.
The Court of Appeals took notice of the purpose of attorney
disciplinary proceedings: to protect the public and not to punish the
erring attorney. Id. at 339, 888 A.2d at 1187. See Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 167, 825 A.2d 430, 451 (2003).
However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland previously established the
general rule applicable for an attorney's intentionally dishonest
conduct in Attorney Grievance Comm 'n of Md. v. Vanderlinde, 364
Md. 376, 413-415, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001). Kinnane, 390 Md. at
339, 888 A.2d at 1187. According to precedent, in the absence of
compelling extenuating circumstances, the usual sanction is
disbarment. Id. In applying Vanderlinde to the case at bar, the Court
of Appeals held that Kinnane's deliberate dishonesty and intentional
acts for personal gain required the sanction of disbarment. Id. at 340,
888 A.2d at 1188.
In Kinnane, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affIrmed the grounds
for disbarment in Maryland for violations involving the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct. However, in so holding, the Court
fashioned a middle ground and held disbarment to be a proper sanction
only when the attorney's conduct is intentionally dishonest and
without mitigating or compelling extenuating circumstances.

